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Evaluating Market Reactions to
Non-Practicing Entity Litigation
Emiliano Giudici*, Justin Blount**
ABSTRACT
An ongoing debate in patent law involves the role
"non-practicing entities," sometimes called "patent trolls," serve in the
patent system. Some argue they serve as valuable market
intermediaries, while others contend they are a drain on innovation
and an impediment o a well-functioning patent system. This Article
adds to the data available in this debate by conducting an event study
that analyzes the market reaction to patent litigation filed by large
"mass aggregator" non-practicing entities against large publicly traded
companies. This study advances the literature by attempting to
reproduce the results of previous event studies done in this area with
newer market data and by subjecting the event study results to more
rigorous statistical analysis. In contrast to a previous event study, the
Authors found that the market reacted little, if at all, to the patent
litigation filed by large non-practicing entities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An ongoing and important debate in patent law concerns the
actions of "non-practicing entities" or "patent assertion entities,"
which are sometimes pejoratively referred to as "patent trolls"
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "NPEs").1 Generally, NPEs are
individuals or entities that own a patent, either through invention or
acquisition, but do not use it to produce or manufacture anything.2
Most NPEs referred to as patent trolls do not invent-their typical
business model is to license or purchase patent rights and assert them
through litigation against entities that make products that allegedly
infringe upon their patent rights.3 Depending upon whom you ask,
NPEs are either valid, useful actors in the market for innovation or
leeches that feed off the innovation of others.4
This Article seeks to add to the literature on this debate by
analyzing what the market has to say about NPE litigation through
an event study.5 Many of the targets of NPE litigation are publicly
traded companies. If the market exhibits at least some level of
efficiency, and if NPE litigation in fact stifles innovation and creates
costs for product-producing companies, one would expect to see some
effect on the market when new patent litigation is filed.6 Using the
1. See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 138-39 (2015) ("Patent trolls-patent-holding entities that do
not make any products but sue or threaten others with patent infringement-are the subject of
intense debate.").
2. See id. at 139 (defining NPEs as "individuals or businesses that do not make any
products and instead make their money from licensing or asserting patents against entities that
do make products").
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 462-66
(2012) (summarizing the debate between critics of and advocates for NPEs).
5. See A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 13, 13 (1997) ("Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact of
a specific event on the value of a firm.").
6. Id. ("The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given rationality in the
marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices."); see also
James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls,
34 REG. 26, 28 (2011) (conducting a previous event study on patent litigation).
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RPX Corporation patent litigation database,7 this study analyzes the
effect that NPE patent litigation brought by the ten largest NPEs had
on the stock price of the eight largest targets of NPE patent litigation
claims to determine whether and to what extent the market reacts to
the filing of these claims.8 Based upon this analysis, it appears the
market largely ignores the filing of NPE patent claims against large
companies, calling into question the damaging effect on innovation
and the economy claimed by the opponents of NPEs.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides an
overview of NPEs and briefly discusses previous studies of their
activities. Part III discusses the empirical analysis of eight large
targets of NPE claims and fully discusses the research methodology,
results, and conclusions of this research. Finally, Part IV provides
concluding remarks addressing the impact of this study on the NPE
policy debate and further research that needs to be conducted.
II. THE NPE DEBATE AND PRIOR STUDIES
The presence of NPEs is controversial because their actions do
not reflect how one typically envisions the patent system working. A
traditional (arguably idealized) view of the patent system involves an
inventor slaving away in a laboratory to refine an invention or
scientific process.9 Once perfected, the inventor (or the inventor's
employer) either uses that invention to advance a scientific discipline
or make a product, or licenses the patent rights to someone who will
use them.10 Simply put, the patent system is intended to further
innovation and invention by providing economic incentives to
inventors through patent rights." The rise of NPEs has sparked a
7. RPX CORP., https://insight.rpxcorp.com/ [https://perma.cc/5V2G-SCBX] (last visited
Sep. 24, 2016).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, STAN. TECH. L. REV., Jan.
2012, at 18 ("In a perfect world .... [a]n inventor, incentivized by the rewards available through
the patent system, creates an invention bringing forth the idea for all to see and benefit from.
The inventor either manufactures a product resulting from the invention or licenses the
invention to others for manufacture.").
10. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PATENT
LITIGATION LANDSCAPE: RECENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/201603_patent_1itigation_issu
e brief-cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H5P-JSBU] (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
11. See, e.g., Patent Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims [https://perma.cc/8E5Y-KX2B] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2017) ("The U.S. Patent System is supposed to represent a bargain between
inventors and the public. In theory, it is simple: in exchange for dedicating a novel invention to
society, along with a clear explanation of how to practice that invention, a patent applicant gets
a 20-year monopoly.").
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debate regarding their role in this system. Some claim that NPEs
further the intent of the patent system by allowing nonproducing
inventors to receive compensation for their valuable patent rights,
while others assert they simply take advantage of this system by
exploiting those actively utilizing patents.12  Next, this Article
discusses these conflicting viewpoints.
In the minds of critics, NPEs are not valuable contributors to
this system; instead, they are merely exploiters of it.13 The Obama
administration referred to NPEs as a "major problem."14 Some of
these critics argue NPE patent claims are asserted against companies
that are not being accused of illegitimately or intentionally copying
the patent, but have instead independently invented something that
allegedly infringes upon the purchased patent rights.15 Thus, if NPEs,
which have invented nothing, are asserting patents that would
otherwise not be asserted against inventors and producers of products,
their actions are a drag on innovation and an abuse of the patent
system.16 Furthermore, given the realities of patent litigation, some
argue that many defendants in NPE litigation settle, even though they
do not believe the suit has merit, simply because the costs and
uncertainty of litigation are too high.17 Under this view of NPEs, their
actions do not represent a contribution to the aims of the patent
system but rather its illegitimate use, necessitating patent law reform
to curtail their activities.18 Some have even argued this problem is
becoming worse because NPEs are growing in size and acquiring
12. See Risch, supra note 4, at 462-66.
13. See, e.g., Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/
06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation [https://perma.cc/2QRW-6CE2] (quoting
President Obama as saying NPEs "don't actually produce anything themselves. They're just
trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort some
money out of them.").
14. See id.
15. See Feldman & Lemley, supra note 1, at 142-43 ("Finally, the evidence suggests that
the overwhelming majority of patent cases do not involve alleged copying, but rather
independent invention. . . . Under these circumstances, patent licensing does not benefit society
by encouraging learning or dissemination of the patentee's invention." (internal footnotes
omitted)).
16. See id. ("The dissemination of that technology was already happening, no thanks to
the patentee; the patent troll is just collecting a tax from people who not only came up with the
idea on their own, but actually put the invention into practice.").
17. See id. at 140 ("At worst, patent trolls may be collecting payments on patents that
are invalid, or not infringed. Given the economics of patent litigation, a rational company may
choose to pay a license fee and thereby avoid the costs and risks of a lawsuit.").
18. See, e.g., Sperling, supra note 13 (noting the Obama administration's belief that NPE
litigation takes a "significant toll" on the economy and innovation, necessitating executive and
legislative action).
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larger patent portfolios, becoming "mass aggregators."19 If the activity
of NPEs truly is damaging, then these mass aggregator NPEs could be
capable of larger-scale damage to innovation and the economy than
previous NPE activity.20
The basic argument for the positive value of NPEs is they can
serve an intermediary function in the patent economy.21 Some patent
holders may not have the resources to either enforce their patent
rights or otherwise economically exploit their invention.22 If an NPE
purchases the patent rights from these holders, they can then receive
some economic benefit from their inventive efforts. In return, the
NPE economically benefits from its purchase by enforcing valid legal
rights that were previously unenforced.23 If NPEs truly operate in
this way, then they may be serving a valuable intermediary market
function by funneling resources to inventors who would otherwise not
be compensated for their efforts.24  Presumably, some of these
inventors will use these resources to continue to innovate, furthering
the goals of the patent system.25
19. See Feldman & Ewing, supra note 9, at 1-2 (estimating that Intellectual Ventures, a
large NPE, has a patent portfolio of "30,000-60,000 patents worldwide, which would make it the
5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US company and the 15th largest of any company in
the world.").
20. See id. at 23-35 (discussing the potential harms to the economy and innovation
created by large NPE mass aggregators with huge patent portfolios).
21. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities
in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 428 (2014) ("Under one narrative, NPEs serve an
important market need: acting as an intermediary for some patentees.").
22. Id.
23. See id. ("NPEs accept the risks and uncertainty associated with attempting to
enforce the patent rights. And NPEs expect and are entitled to make money for assuming those
risks and uncertainty. Without the payment from an NPE, the inventors would receive no
compensation whatsoever for their invention.").
24. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) ("Essentially, trolls are serving a function as intermediaries that
specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that cannot be exploited effectively by those
that have originally obtained them. That is not in and of itself a bad thing.").
25. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the
Computer & Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute Program:
Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 3 (June 20,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/competition-law-
patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/ 30620paespeech.pdf
[https://perma.ccl6CWW-7WF5] (noting that selling patent rights to NPEs can provide money to
start-ups that have valuable technology but which have failed as operating businesses, allowing
them to invest in more research and development).
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This debate regarding NPEs persists because each of these
positions are logical, rational, and difficult to prove.26 Researchers
have previously conducted numerous empirical studies in an attempt
to determine which position in this debate is supported by evidence.27
These studies utilized various methodologies and came to different
conclusions.28  The differing results of these studies reveal some
fundamental difficulties in studying this area, including
disagreements on both how to properly identify NPE litigation and
how to define what types of entities should be considered NPEs.29
Numerous entities that do not produce goods, such as universities or
individual inventors, may still seek to enforce their patent rights yet
do not fit the description of the NPEs which are accused of exploiting
and abusing the patent system.30 When studies lump all of these
various entities together for purposes of analyzing litigation, the
results may be potentially misleading or inaccurate.31 The goal of
these studies is to determine whether NPEs accused of exploiting the
patent system, such as mass aggregators, have a negative effect on the
patent system. Thus, lawsuits filed by NPEs that are not accused of
being exploitative, such as universities that license or enforce patents
without producing goods, need to be removed from the dataset of
26. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810-11 (2007) ("Like most fresh legal
questions, the debate on patent trolls is long on passion and short on proof. . . . The only thing
that both sides might agree upon is that there is no real evidence about the impact that trolls are
having on technology investment, which makes drawing policy conclusions in this area especially
hazardous."); see also Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 21, at 451 ("Currently, there is a lack of
scientific evidence that widespread and systematic problems exist with NPEs, and if they do,
what the magnitude of the problems is.").
27. See Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan H. Ashtor & Samantha Zyontz, Do NPEs Matter?
Non-Practicing Entities and Patent Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879,
884-85 (2013) (discussing various empirical studies of NPE litigation).
28. See id.; see also John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality
and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 708-09 (2011) (examining
patent quality of repeat patent litigants and finding evidence that indicates that NPEs tend to
litigate weaker patents than producing companies, indicating potential social harm from NPE
litigation). But see, e.g., Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 118 (2010) (conducting an analysis
of NPE-owned patents and finding that "NPE patents and their litigation behavior provide a
generally favorable picture of NPEs").
29. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 654 (2015) (arguing that a lack of
transparency regarding the data underlying previous studies about entities such as NPEs led to
a "fundamental barrier" in understanding the NPE debate and that a more thorough dataset
concerning litigation from 2010 to 2012 presents a differing narrative).
30. See id. at 654, 656-57.
31. See id. at 654.
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litigation and entities being studied in order to obtain reliable
results.32
This Article seeks to advance the literature in this area by
providing empirical results of an event study that analyzes the stock
price effects of patent lawsuits-filed by a defined universe of large
mass aggregator NPEs-against publicly traded companies. These
are the types of NPEs that are almost universally considered
dangerous patent trolls, disruptive to innovation.33 Focusing on these
entities avoids the definitional difficulties inherent in many of these
previous studies.
Before discussing methodology and results, it is important to
discuss a previous prominent event study of NPE litigation conducted
by James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, and Michael J. Meurer, which used a
similar methodology.34 That study used a sample of 1,630 lawsuits
filed by NPEs against one or more publicly traded companies between
January 1990 and October 2010 and analyzed the impact these
lawsuits had on the stock prices of the defendant companies.35 Since
many of these lawsuits involved multiple corporate defendants, the
total number of events analyzed was 4,114.36 These events were then
analyzed to determine whether investors in the stock market react
positively, negatively, or not at all when an NPE filed a patent lawsuit
against a public company.37 If markets are reasonably efficient, and if
NPEs are reducing innovation and investment in new technology,
then one would expect the filing of a patent lawsuit by an NPE to
result in abnormal negative returns to a defendant company's stock
price.38
Using that methodology, the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study
claimed NPE lawsuits resulted in "half a trillion dollars of lost wealth
to defendants from 1990 through 2010" and, during the last four years
of that study, averaged over $80 billion per year in lost wealth,
measured by a decline in market value of the subject stock.39 The
32. See id. at 656.
33. See, e.g., Feldman & Ewing, supra note 9, at 1-2 (discussing the potential harms to
the economy and innovation created by large NPE mass aggregators with huge patent portfolios).




38. See id. at 26 ("To the extent that the recent NPEs opportunistically assert 'fuzzy
patents' against real technology firms, they can decrease the incentives for these firms to
innovate. Innovators deciding to invest in new technology have to consider the risk of
inadvertent infringement as a cost of doing business. This risk reduces the rents they can expect
to earn on their investment and hence decreases their willingness to invest.").
39. Id.
2017] 57
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Executive Office of the President cited that study in its 2013 report on
the dangers NPEs pose to the patent system.40  However, a
subsequent article by Ron Katznelson in the same journal criticized its
methodology and findings.4 1
Katznelson appeared to take issue with Bessen, Ford, and
Meurer's attempt to quantify the amount of wealth lost to NPE
lawsuits through an event study.42 He noted that event studies can be
valuable economic studies, but only if they capture the entire event
and its effect on the market, which can be a difficult-to-determine
window of time.43 With respect to the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer
study, he argued that in order to get a full accounting of the economic
impact of NPE lawsuits, the study should have included not only the
filing of the lawsuit itself (the event which was measured) but also the
resolution of the lawsuit (which was not measured).4 4 By attempting
to measure the total economic impact of these lawsuits only by their
filing, Katznelson argued their study ignored any corrections to stock
price that may be made upon the disposition of a suit.4 5 Indeed,
Katznelson claimed that upon reviewing the full disposition of three
patent cases analyzed in that study, he found the stock price positively
40. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION
9 (2013), [hereinafter EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT] https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EP6-RUN2].
41. See Ron D. Katznelson, The $83 Billion Patent Litigation Fallacy, 39 REG. 14, 15
(2016) (criticizing Bessen, Ford, and Meurer's study and asserting that "its cost estimates and
inferences should be dismissed, along with their indictment of NPEs and similar patent
holders").
42. See id. ("A central claim of the report is that patent lawsuits by NPEs recently
caused lost wealth of over $300 billion over four years. . . . They claim losses to defendants in
NPE patent suits during a period of four years 'average over $83 billion per year in 2010 dollars,
which equals over a quarter of U.S. industrial R&D spending per annum.'. . . As I explain below,
its cost estimates and inferences should be dismissed, along with their indictment of NPEs and
similar patent holders.").
43. See id. at 15-16.
44. See id. at 16 ("Another problem with the authors' analysis is they fail to include all
components of each patent litigation 'event.' Their method tracks the stock value effects of patent
litigation only upon filing of the lawsuit, but they ignore any subsequent related stock value
corrections or gains upon disposition of the lawsuit in an announced settlement or a final
verdict.").
45. See id. ("The initial stock price hit is conflated by uncertainty over who is right and
who is wrong, uncertainty about how the courts will resolve the matter if it goes to trial, and
uncertainty about how the parties will settle the matter if they do not go to trial. Put simply, by
not including analysis of the disposition of the lawsuit, Bessen, Ford, and Meurer fail to account
for the market economic information effect of the 'complete transaction' of the patent litigation.").
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adjusted-sometimes greater than the initial decline-after resolution
of the dispute.46
Katznelson further criticized an inference drawn by the
authors of that study-namely, the economic loss that they estimated
represented a direct economic disincentive to innovate due to NPE
litigation.47 Katznelson argued there was a more plausible alternative
interpretation of the results-that the defendants' stock price was
previously inflated due to their unlawful infringement.48 Under this
interpretation, the defendant companies were "free riding" by using
patents in their business without any right to do so.4 9 If their stock
price represented the economic rents gained from this free riding, then
a suit filed to "keep them honest" could (and arguably should)
represent a proportional decrease in stock price reflecting a correction
of this free riding.50 Katznelson further argued this inference is made
all the more plausible by the fact that research and development
(R&D) expenditures of large companies increased after they were sued
for patent infringement.51 If NPE litigation was truly a disincentive to
innovate, he argued these companies should not have been increasing
their R&D budgets.52
Finally, Katznelson argued the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer
study ignored important social costs and gains which may arise from
patent litigation but are not reflected in the defendants' stock price.53
By focusing only on the negative economic costs reflected in the stock
46. See id. at 17 ("Using identical statistical method and event windows, I carefully
examined three of the authors' NPE cases, creating a 'full transaction' analysis that accounts for
decision, settlement, or other legal disposition. Not surprisingly, the CAR values I obtained were
negative on filing of the lawsuit in all three cases, ranging from -0.26 percent to -2.45 percent.
However, I found the opposite sign upon case disposition-indeed, sometimes the gain in value
on disposition far exceeded the loss on filing.").
47. See id. at 16.
48. See id. ("Rather than a deadweight loss to innovation, a more plausible
interpretation is that the lost market value simply reflects the disappearance of projected gains
from patent infringement. The defendant firm's stock value prior to the suit's filing should
include substantial built-in market valuation of the firm's free-riding on others' patented
technologies.").
49. See id.
50. See id. ("Rather than a deadweight loss in innovation, a more plausible
interpretation is that the lost market value simply reflects the disappearence of projected gains
from patent infringement.").
51. See id. (noting that a previous study, conducted by Bessen and Meurer, found that
firms that were sued for patent infringement spend more heavily on R&D).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 17 ("The authors also miscalculate the social cost of patent litigation
because they overlook fundamental economic effects of patent enforcement and because they do
not include the wealth effects on parties other than the specific defendants in the lawsuits they
covered.").
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price at the time the litigation was filed, Katznelson argued that the
study does not take into account potentially positive spillover
economic effects of the lawsuit filing that should be netted against any
decrease in stock price.54 Katznelson argued that Bessen, Ford, and
Meurer fail to account for potential positive effects, such as the
increase in value of other patents not being litigated, the benefits
gained from being incentivized to "design around" the patent claims,
and the deterrent effect against misappropriation of technology by
other potential infringers.65 It is possible that these effects of NPE
litigation could outweigh any potential decreases in the stock price of
the corporate defendants.
While valid, these criticisms largely stem from a fundamental
problem of overextending the conclusions that can be drawn from a
particular event study.56 Event studies can be valuable tools for
analyzing whether a particular event, in the judgment of the stock
market, matters with respect to a specific company in that they
represent a piece of potentially valuable evidence regarding whether
that event is sufficiently important to affect stock price.57 However, it
is problematic to assume any single event study could be considered
an accurate measure of all, or even a significant portion of, the societal
economic gains or losses caused by the event. For example, as
Katznelson pointed out, there are various spillover effects-both
positive and negative-that may occur from the filing of patent
litigation which may not be reflected in the defendant's stock price
because they do not directly affect the defendant.5 8  This is
particularly the case in areas of social study, such as legal and policy
decision-making, where determining whether and to what extent
economic impact can be attributed to that particular action can be
difficult. 59 Thus, the Authors argue that the main problem with the
54. See id. at 17-18 ("'Costs' are net reductions in aggregate welfare. Failing to net them
is an obvious error.").
55. See id. at 18 (discussing various spillover effects of patent litigation not accounted
for in the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer analysis).
56. See, e.g., Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Event Studies in Management
Research: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 626, 627 (1997) ("We do not have
any quarrel with the validity of the event study methodology or its use in management research,
per se. . . . However, the lack of information regarding the validity of assumptions and several
research design issues in some articles raises questions about the confidence that readers can
place in the conclusions drawn.").
57. See id.
58. See Katznelson, supra note 41, at 17-18.
59. See McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 639 (discussing the problem with using
event studies in measuring the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions, noting
that "[t]his is an area in which researchers desire to have an impact on public policy decision
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Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study is not so much with its methodology
(although it has some potential methodological problems, namely
additional statistical analysis needed, which the Authors' study
addresses), but rather with the strength of the inferences it draws.60
This is particularly problematic because that study has been fairly
heavily relied upon by the Executive Office of the President in
criticizing the value of NPEs.61
This Article tests the strength of the inferences drawn from the
Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study by attempting to replicate its
results.62 This event study uses a more limited subset of large,
publicly traded companies targeted with patent infringement suits by
large mass aggregator NPEs.63 This study focuses on these large
NPEs due to their size and prominence, because if the filing of NPE
litigation is a noticeable event to investors that leads to abnormal
returns in the stock market, then the abnormal returns should be
most noticeable when a large NPE files suit against a large company.
This is because large NPEs are asserted to have the most power to
cause the most economic damage through patent litigation, due to
their size.64 Additionally, this study focuses on only these large NPE
entities who file patent litigation as a business, and which are
generally referred to by the pejorative "patent troll," to differentiate
them from other NPEs, such as universities or individual inventors
that may own patents and assert them but do not produce products.65
This isolates the effect of mass aggregator NPE litigation and
addresses the criticisms raised by Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz
regarding the classification of NPE entities affecting results of
studies.66 The Authors further test the results of the Bessen, Ford,
making, but it has been difficult for them to do so because of the problems involved in measuring
the impact of managerial decisions").
60. See id. at 646 (noting that some previous event studies claimed "quite dramatic
value effects" but that these results could not be replicated and could be explained by more
advanced statistical tests).
61. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 40, at 9.
62. See McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 639 (utilizing this same methodology to
evaluate event studies in the area of CSR).
63. See, e.g., Feldman & Ewing, supra note 9, at 1-2 (discussing large NPE mass
aggregators with huge patent portfolios).
64. See id. at 27-29 (discussing the potential harms to the economy and innovation
created by mass aggregators that may extort large settlements from practicing entities).
65. See Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 651, 653 (describing patent trolls,
then noting that previous studies confused these different entities: "[O]ther researchers cannot
often determine which entities were classified as PAEs or NPEs, what revenue numbers were
associated with these entities, and other information necessary to evaluate the claims. This
information is critical to verify, as a policy matter, whether PAEs are engaging in strategic and
opportunistic behavior that does not benefit anyone except them.").
66. See id.
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and Meurer study by conducting more advanced statistical analysis on
the results, including nonparametric tests.6 7
If the findings of the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study are valid
and current, then one would expect to see larger abnormal returns in
this more limited dataset than in their previous study. If these
findings cannot be replicated, the next question is why. It could be
that the results of the original study were invalid or the inferences
drawn therefrom were simply too sweeping. Or, it could be that
something has happened over time to ameliorate any negative effects
of NPE litigation. Part III discusses the methodology of this event
study and provides results.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
The overall purpose of this event study is to provide evidence
about investors' perceptions of NPE legal action against publicly
traded companies. If investors perceive that litigation will be costly to
the defending firm, their trading actions could result in a drop in stock
price.68 In this context, it is important to notice the "cost of litigation"
is not limited to the cost of the trial or the size of monetary awards to
the NPEs-it extends to expected economic consequences on future
production of technological products and services.69
Market reactions to news are not restricted to the size of
changes in stock prices (i.e., returns) but could also have an impact on
their dynamic evolution.70 For example, if investors are concerned
with the content of an imminent press release from the CEO of a firm,
that firm's stock might exhibit frantic price swings leading to a wide
range of returns (i.e., volatility). While this might appear to be
inconsequential, it could have serious repercussions in the prices of
financial options71 and in the execution of automated trading orders,7 2
67. See McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 635 (noting the importance of conducting
nonparametric statistical tests to explain any potential outliers or nonnormal results).
68. See Katznelson, supra note 41, at 16-17 (discussing the potential economic impacts
to future production of patent litigation and how they could be reflected in stock price).
69. See id.
70. See Robert F. Engle & Victor K. Ng, Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on
Volatility, 48 J. FIN. 1749, 1750 (1993) (noting that the relationship between the volatility of
stock returns and some types of events is well known in financial literature and that statistical
techniques have been developed to assess different aspects of this relationship).
71. The price of a financial option depends on the price of the underlying asset and on
the volatility of the returns of the underlying asset. See, e.g., John Hull & Alan White, The
Pricing of Options on Assets with Stochastic Volatilities, 42 J. FIN. 281, 281 (1987) (discussing the
solution for the valuation of certain options).
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possibly spilling over to prices of assets not directly involved in the
content of the press release.7 3  Given that the filings of patent
litigation initiated by NPEs are publicly available information, this
study aims to detect investors' reactions around the date of filing.
A. Event Study Methodology
The first battery of tests aims to measure whether returns of
the defending firm departed from their typical (or expected) behavior
around the filing date (i.e., the event window). At any point in time
(t), the difference between the actual return of the firm i (rit) and the
return that is expected from i ( E[rit] ) is termed the abnormal return
of the firm ( ARi,t ).74 Abnormal returns are collected for each firm
and grouped according to their timing relative to the filing event. For
instance, one group is formed of all abnormal returns obtained three
trading days before the filing date, another with the abnormal returns
obtained two days before the filing date, etc. The abnormal returns in
each group are then averaged and tested.
The main issue with the event study methodology is defining
what the expected return should be.75 Many variants have been used
previously, which can be grouped into two broad categories: models
without adjustments for differences in risk and risk-adjusted models.76
The simplest unadjusted form defines abnormal returns as
follows:
ARL,t :- i,t - rm,t (1)7
Where ri,t is the return of firm i at time t and rm,t is the return of
the broad index (i.e., the S&P500) at time t.7 8 In this case, the
72. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity
Markets-From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556 (2015) (discussing
high speed algorithmic trading, which now dominates stock market trading volume).
73. Many investors place buy or sell orders that are automatically executed if prices of
an asset reach a specified value. See, e.g., David Easley, Marcos M. L6pez de Prado & Maureen
O'Hara, The Microstructure of the 'Flash Crash"- Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes and the
Probability of Informed Trading, 37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 118, 119 (2011). Volatility could lead to
price swings large enough to cause execution of large blocks of those orders, leading to a
subsequent price change, thus triggering other similar orders in a chain reaction. See, e.g., id. at
118-19 (discussing the "Flash Crash" of 2010, which was initially believed to be triggered by an
accidental trade followed by a cascade of automatic stop loss orders).
74. See MacKinlay, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing abnormal returns in event studies).
75. See id. at 17-21 (discussing methods for calculating expected and abnormal returns
in event studies).
76. See id. at 17-19.
77. See id. at 15.
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expected return is proxied by the return of the broad index. The
implication of this model is that each stock is expected to perform
identically to the index or an "abnormality" is detected.79
The risk-adjusted models recognize that different firms could
exhibit different relations with the broad index and compute the
abnormal return after netting out the effects of this systematic
relationship with the index. The finance literature has popularized
two risk-adjusted models: the market model and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). 80  The market model rests on a set of
statistical assumptions and posits there is a direct relationship
between the returns of an asset and the returns of the index; however,
this specification lacks a sound economical foundation like the
CAPM. 81 The CAPM is developed on solid theoretical grounds and
states that, under conditions of equilibrium, the expected returns of
an asset (E[ri,t]) should be equal to the returns of an asset with no
risk (TRF), plus a premium that is proportional to the systematic risk
of the asset (f.?):
E[rit = RF + fli(E[ri,t] - TRF) (2)82
78. See id.
79. See id. at 17 ("For firm i and event date T the abnormal return is
AR,, = Ri, - E(RidIXi,) where ARi,, Ri,, and E(RilX,) are the abnormal, actual, and
normal returns respectively for time period T. X., is the conditioning information for the normal
return model. There are two common choices for modeling the return-the constant mean return
model where X. is a constant, and the market model where X. is the market return. . . . The
market model assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the security
return." (emphasis in original)). Equation (1) uses the term rm,t to represent X,. See also JOHN
Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS 158 (2d ed. 1997) ("[The methodology is built around the assumption that the event
impact is captured by the abnormal returns.").
80. See, e.g., R. Richardson Pettit & Randolph Westerfield, Using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model and the Market Model to Predict Security Returns, 9 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 579, 579, 582 (1974) (discussing and comparing the CAPM and market model methods
of evaluating portfolio returns).
81. See R.C. Stapleton & M.G. Subrahmanyam, The Market Model and Capital Asset
Pricing Theory: A Note, 5 J. FIN. 1637, 1638 (1983) ("The market model in any of these forms is a
purely statistical relation while asset pricing theories have economic content."); see also John
Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios
and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 14 (1965) (discussing how to use the CAPM to
value investments in stock portfolios).
82. See Cheol S. Eun, The Benchmark Beta, CAPM, and Pricing Anomalies, 46 OXFORD
EcON. PAPERS 330, 330, 332 (1994) ("[I1n the classical CAPM ... the structure of capital market
equilibrium is presented in a highly parsimonious way, relating the equilibrium asset returns to
a single risk factor, namely, the market beta. This parsimonious approach enables the
equilibrium asset pricing relationship to be expounded in a simple and intuitively appealing way,
thereby helping the CAPM to become one of the dominant paradigms in modern finance. . . . The
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM holds that in equilibrium, the expected return on an asset should be
linearly related to the market beta of the asset.").
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In order to estimate the abnormal returns using the CAPM as
a benchmark, there is a need to first estimate the risk of the firm
(f3).83 This goal is accomplished with the following linear regression:
it - TRF - &l + A (rM,t - rRF) + EQ (3)84
Where:
r,t is the return of firm i at time t,
rM,t is the return of the market (i.e., the S&P500) at time t,
rRF is the risk-free rate (the return of Treasury Bills),
a, is a constant,
fl, is the estimated beta, the measure of risk of firm i, and
ECi is an error term.85
Once the beta is estimated, the risk-adjusted return of the firm
(cAPM) can be computed for a given value of market returns:
CAPM - rF + i + A(rut - TRF) (4)86
Finally, the risk-adjusted abnormal returns can be computed by
subtracting the predicted returns computed in (4) from the actual
returns of the firm:
83. See id.; see also William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 426 (1964) ("[Without a] theory describing
the manner in which the price of risk results from the basic influences of investor preferences,
the physical attributes of capital assets, etc.[,] . . . it is difficult to give any real meaning to the
relationship between the price of a single asset and its risk."). The theoretical derivation of
CAPM occurs in terms of expected returns (i.e., forecasted returns), as in equation (2). However,
empirical modeling can only be conducted using realized returns, as in equation (3). See ZVI
BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 293 (9th ed. 2011) ("We have said that the
CAPM is a statement about ex ante or expected returns, whereas in practice all anyone can
observe directly are ex post or realized returns."); see also Lintner, supra note 81, at 14;
Stapleton & Subrahmanyam, supra note 81, at 1638. Furthermore, the linear relation between
firm returns and the market risk premium (T - TRF) is shown to be the risk of the firm (0). See,
e.g., Eun, supra note 82, at 332. Empirical models estimate 0 by means of linear regression. See,
e.g., id. at 330-32 ("[I]f the CAPM holds, then the expected asset returns will be linearly related
not only to the market beta, but also to each of the betas computed against the component
portfolios of the market."). For excellent nontechnical explanations of the models and their
empirical applications, see BODIE, KANE & MARCUS, supra at 280-310, and EDWIN J. ELTON,
MARTIN J. GRUBER, STEPHEN J. BROWN & WILLIAM N. GOETZMANN, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
AND INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 292-305, 338-44 (6th ed. 2003).
84. Pettit & Westerfield, supra note 80, at 581 n.3.
85. See id. at 581.
86. See id. This equation is obtained by algebraic manipulation of equation (3).
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= CAPM (587ARi,t - ri,t - ri'tA (5)"
This study used equation (5) to calculate risk-adjusted
abnormal returns of each stock. To accommodate changes in the beta
of the stocks, it estimated this parameter using the two hundred
trading days prior to each of the filing events. This treatment allowed
flexibility in the model in order to accommodate changes in the firms,
market conditions, and technological innovation. The abnormal
returns were then grouped by their timing relative to the event date
and then subjected to statistical analysis.
B. Description of the Data
The stock and filing data were collected from Yahoo! Finance
and from the RPX Litigation Database.88  The RPX Litigation
Database is an online database of patent litigation maintained by RPX
Corporation89 that has been used by other researchers studying NPE
litigation.90 The target firms involved in this study were selected by
using the top ten companies ranked by the largest number of active
cases filed against them by NPEs at the end of 2014, as reported by
RPX Corporation.91 Two of these companies (Samsung and LG
Electronics) were not included in the study because they are not
traded on a US stock exchange.92 This left a set of eight companies
from the technology and telecommunications industry that were
studied: Apple (AAPL), Amazon.com (AMZN), Alphabet (GOOG),
Microsoft Corporation (MSFT), Sprint Corporation (S), Sony
Corporation (SNE), AT&T (T), and Verizon Communications (VZ). 93
87. See id. This equation is obtained by combining equations (1) and (4).
88. See Yahoo! Finance, YAHOO!, https://finance.yahoo.com/ [https://perma.cc/3DDK-
27R7] (last visited Sep. 24, 2017); RPX CORP., supra note 7.
89. See RPX CORP., supra note 7.
90. See, e.g., Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls:
Evidence from Targeted Firms 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2464303 [https://perma.cclVJA3-UUG7].
91. See RPX CORP., 2014 NPE LITIGATION REPORT 29 tbl.4 (2015) [hereinafter RPX
LITIGATION REPORT], https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/
RPXLitigation-Report-2014_FNL_040615.pdf [https://perma.cclF9RJ-W4BJ].
92. See Prableen Bajpai, Why, and How to Invest in Samsung (SSNLF), NASDAQ (Apr.
22, 2016, 10:21:36 AM EDT), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/why-and-how-to-invest-in-samsung-
ssnlf-cm610116 [https://perma.cc/2D2V-2GYE]; LG Electronics: You Have to Go Overseas to Buy
It, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2007) http://abcnews.go.comfBusiness/story?id=3737510&page=1
[https://perma.cc/CUC3-XEPW].
93. See RPX LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 91, at 29 tbl.4; see also Company List
(NASDAQ, NYSE, & AMEX), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/company-list.aspx
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With respect to the plaintiffs, this study's dataset only includes
lawsuits filed by the top ten NPEs reported by RPX Corporation,
ranked by the number of cases filed between 2010 and 2014.94 These
NPE litigants are large, well-known patent litigation firms: Acacia
Research Corporation, IPNav, Empire IP LLC, Arrivalstar SA/Melvino
Technologies Limited, Marathon Patent Group Incorporated, eDekka
LLC, Uniloc Corporation Pty Limited, Novelpoint Holdings LLC,
Altitude Capital Partners, and Pragmatus.9 5 The RPX Litigation
Database allows for lawsuits to be filtered by plaintiff and includes
subsidiaries of these corporations when performing such searches.96
Thus, the dataset includes lawsuits filed by wholly owned subsidiaries
of the above companies. By limiting the event study to only these top
NPE litigants, the hope is to remove any potential inaccuracies in the
conclusions that could result from including NPEs which are not
generally considered to be patent trolls, such as universities, in the
data.97 When applying these filters to the RPX Litigation Database,
the earliest reported lawsuit was in 2003.98 Although this results in a
more limited sample size of 555 lawsuits and 380 events,9 9 this more
limited dataset responds to criticisms of previous patent litigation
studies while still resulting in a sufficient sample of events from which
to draw statistically meaningful results.10 0
The average return and the standard deviation are reported in
Table 1, subdivided by year.101 All of the firms in the sample
experienced negative returns, and an increase in standard deviation,
during the financial crisis in 2008.102 That low performance of 2008
was followed by a decrease in volatility for all firms in the sample.
Furthermore, in 2009 MSFT experienced its highest average returns
in the sample while AAPL, AMZN, S, and SNE exhibited their
[https://perma.ccIY44J-HSKC] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017); Heather Kelly, Meet Google
Alphabet-Google's New Parent Company, CNN (Aug. 11, 2015, 6:01 PM ET),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/10/technology/alphabet-google/index.html, [https://perma.ccNAP8-
8SEA].
94. See RPX LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 91, at 30 tbl.7.
95. See id.
96. See RPX CORP., supra note 7; NPE Identification, https://insight.rpxcorp.com/
features#npeidentification [https://perma.ccfV8Q3-HM3K] (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
97. See Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 650-53 (noting that many NPEs
are not patent trolls because they play important economic roles).
98. See infra Table 2.
99. See infra Table 2. The number of "events" for purposes of the event study is smaller
than the number of lawsuits because on some dates multiple lawsuits were filed against the
same defendant.
100. See Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 653.
101. See infra Table 1.
102. See infra Table 1.
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second-highest average returns.103  Overall, the sample period
includes both bear and bull markets, with fifty-nine out of eighty-five
years-firm with average positive returns.104
Table 2 reports the number of days with at least one patent
litigation filing by NPEs against the firms in the sample.105 The
original data from the RPX Litigation Database included lawsuits that
were not new filings but were instead transfers from another district
court. Accordingly, the Authors analyzed the data manually and
removed any transferred cases reported as new filings. The number of
days with filings markedly increased over the years included in the
study.106 Overall, AAPL and T were the firms targeted the most
frequently by NPEs.107 The rapidly increasing volume of legal actions
could indicate that the firms in the sample have become increasingly
careless in violating patent laws or that undertaking litigation has
become increasingly more rewarding for the NPEs initiating the
litigation.
Table 3 reports the number of events (days with at least one
litigation filing) for each month of the year.108 The firms in the sample
were involved in litigation an average of 2.5 times each month over
the 152 months of the dataset.109 Given that most lawsuits were filed
in the recent few years, this average is a considerably conservative
estimate of NPEs' activity.110 Table 3 also suggests March (4.62 days
with at least one filing) is by far the most popular month for filing a
lawsuit, followed by November (3.17), while December (1.75) and July
(1.71) are the least popular.' Furthermore, almost 40 percent of the
lawsuits are filed in a month in which the firms prepare their
quarterly reports.112 While the reports are normally released to the
public one month later, only 28 percent of the lawsuits are filed in
months during which the companies released quarterly reports.113
This filing pattern indicates NPEs opportunistically file lawsuits
around financial reporting periods.
103. See infra Table 1.
104. See Jen Wieczner, Happy Birthday, Bull Market! It May Be Your Last, FORTUNE
(Mar. 9, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/03/09/stock-market-bull-market-longest/,
[https://perma.cclTRP9-BHUZ]; infra Table 1.
105. See infra Table 2.
106. See infra Table 2.
107. See infra Table 2.
108. See infra Table 3.
109. See infra Table 3.
110. See infra Table 2.
111. See infra Table 3.
112. See infra Table 3.
113. See infra Table 3.
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C. Results
The statistical tests on the abnormal returns were conducted
by aggregating the abnormal returns for all the firms and by testing
the impact of the lawsuits on each individual firm. The results of the
statistical tests are reported in Tables 4, 5A, 5B, and 5C and examine
the abnormal returns for each day in the two trading weeks around
the filing date.114
At the aggregate level, tests of the mean abnormal returns
appear to be negative on filing date; however, they are not statistically
significant.115 Five trading days after the filing the target firms
exhibit a positive abnormal return.116  This could suggest that
investors realize the impact of the lawsuits will not have a
long-lasting impact on the value of the stock.117 Perhaps this reaction
could be influenced by press releases produced by the target firms in
the days following the filing.
The weak reactions found in this study are in contrast with the
Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study.118 While this study found no
statistically significant abnormal returns, Bessen, Ford, and Meurer
found negative cumulative abnormal returns for five- and
twenty-five-day event windows.119
There are potential explanations for this discrepancy in results,
even if both studies were correctly conducted and presented accurate
results. The Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study does not clearly identify
whether it differentiates between patent troll NPEs and other NPEs
who might sue to enforce a patent, such as individual inventors and
universities.12 0  This failure to account for the different types of
litigants could be a contributing factor to the different results,
particularly if lawsuits filed by non-patent troll NPEs tend to be more
114. See infra Tables 4, 5A, 5B & 5C.
115. See infra Table 4.
116. See infra Table 4.
117. See infra Table 4. Note that this finding is inconsistent with the findings of Bessen,
Ford, and Meurer's previous study, which found no quick price correction. See Bessen, Ford &
Meurer, supra note 6, at 29-30 (discussing that price did not correct after the initial drop, which
they claim "suggests that the initial loss of wealth was not an overreaction by investors that was
subsequently corrected, at least not within 25 days").
118. See Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 6, at 26 ("We find that NPE lawsuits are
associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010.
During the last four years, the lost wealth has averaged over $80 billion per year.").
119. See id. at 30.
120. See id. at 28 (noting that the methodology of the study and not providing a clear
explanation of the type or identity of NPE plaintiffs included in the study).
2017] 69
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
meritorious, resulting in larger market reactions.12 1  Notably,
although Bessen, Ford, and Meurer's overall study relied upon all
NPE litigants, they did separate out a subset of publicly held NPE
firms (which would fit the generally held definition of
patent troll-type entities) that filed patent litigation from their overall
data.12 2  This subset represented 574 separate litigation events,
approximately 14 percent of the total events they analyzed.123 They
reported similar results for these publicly traded NPEs, so it would
appear that to the extent that Bessen, Ford, and Meurer did analyze
different entity types within the data set, they obtained the same
results as their overall study.124
Another potential explanation for this discrepancy is time. The
Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study covered a large sample of diverse
firms for a period spanning two decades-from 1990 to 2010.125 It
could be that in the earlier days of NPEs investors were not aware of
their true intent (namely to extract a settlement) and responded
strongly to a lawsuit, fearing the legal action would impact the future
product development of the target firms. Now that this type of
litigation is more commonplace, investors may be able to more
accurately incorporate it into their investing decisions and not react as
strongly.12 6
An intervening event that occurred after the Bessen, Ford, and
Meurer study, and which could potentially have been a cause of the
differing results, was the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA) in 2011.127 The AIA reforms various aspects of patent law,
with some changes aimed at reducing NPE litigation practices
regarding joinder that many perceived as abusive.128 Prior to the
enactment of the AIA, NPEs were often accused of opportunistically
using the federal joinder rules in patent litigation to file a single
121. See Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 653 (noting the problem in
empirical patent studies of not differentiating between different types of NPE litigants).
122. See Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 6, at 32.
123. Id.
124. Id. ("The aggregate losses to the defendants in those lawsuits from 2000 through
October 2010 total $87.6 billion in 2010 dollars, about 17 percent of the total.").
125. Id. at 28.
126. See, e.g., infra Table 2.
127. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C.).
128. See David 0. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 654 (2013) ("In
enacting this new statutory section, Congress and the President took a significant step toward
correcting a perceived problem plaguing patent infringement litigation-so-called 'patent trolls'
joining numerous unrelated accused infringers in inconvenient venues.").
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patent infringement suit against multiple, unrelated alleged
infringers.129
One goal of such joinder is to reduce the costs to the NPE of
filing suit because a single lawsuit can be filed rather than multiple
suits in multiple fora.130 Another goal is to increase the costs of the
lawsuit for the defendants.13 1 While there are some potential cost
savings for defendants in mounting a joint defense in a single lawsuit,
there are various unique aspects to patent litigation that typioally
significantly drive up costs.13 2 Finally, NPE litigants are accused of
joining multiple defendants in a case to support venue in a desirable
forum, typically the Eastern District of Texas-which is considered a
favorable forum for patent litigation plaintiffs.133
The AIA seeks to curb this allegedly abusive use of the existing
joinder practice in federal courts by essentially creating a special rule
of joinder for patent cases.134 While the details of this new joinder
provision are outside the scope of this Article, in essence it requires a
heightened standard of commonality between the patent claims and
the defendants joined in the lawsuit.135 This new standard has the
goal of reducing joinder of patent defendants to curb abusive practices
such as forum shopping.136
While the AIA was an intervening event, it is doubtful that this
change in law would have a significant effect on the results of this
event study relative to the Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study. First,
this study's dataset contains a number of lawsuits filed before the
AIA's joinder provision took effect, as noted in Table 2.137 Also, the
joinder provision of the AILA seems tailored to curb the location of
litigation and costs associated with the number of defendants in a
particular lawsuit, as opposed to the economic impact of any
129. See id. at 654, 660 (discussing the allegations that patent troll litigation was a
driving force behind the changes to joinder in patent litigation implemented by the AIA).
130. See id. at 672.
131. See id. at 673.
132. See id. ("[Wihen multiple parties, multiple patents, multiple claims, and multiple
accused products are involved, the costs and complexities [of patent cases] will often increase
exponentially." (alteration in original) (quoting John D. Love, Jessica L. Hannah & Jong K. Choi,
Complex Patent Cases: Observations from the Bench, 13 SMU Scl. & TECH. L. REV. 121, 121
(2010))).
133. See id. at 675-77.
134. See id. at 654, 692 ("The AIA effectively creates a new rule governing both
permissive joinder and consolidation for trial in most patent infringement litigation.").
135. See id. at 696-700 (discussing the joinder provisions of the AIA).
136. See id. at 658-59.
137. See infra Table 2; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 35, 125 Stat. 284, 341 (2011).
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particular lawsuit.3 8 If anything, this reform might have increased
the number of events in this study, as Table 2 notably shows an
increase in litigation since 2011.139 However, this increase in
litigation events would be unlikely to have a significant effect on the
economic impact of any individual event. Given the size of the
companies involved, the cost of carrying out the litigation would likely
not predominate in the mind of investors-rather, the more important
consideration would be the effect that the outcome of the litigation
would have on a company's future cash flows through product
development and R&D. 140
Finally, even after 2011, the dataset reflected the Eastern
District of Texas as by far the most popular forum for the litigation
filed.141 As seen in Table 6A, 47.29 percent of the cases brought since
September 16, 2011 (the AIA became effective on September 15, 2011)
were brought in the Eastern District of Texas.142  Prior to the
138. See Taylor, supra note 128 at 658-59.
139. See infra Table 2; see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C.).
140. The value of a firm can be estimated by adding the present values of future expected
cash flows. See, e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 626-27 ("Stock prices are supposed
to reflect the true value of firms, because they are assumed to reflect the discounted value of all
future cash flows and incorporate all relevant information."). A one-time settlement would lower
the next expected cash flow without impacting the remaining future cash flows. See, e.g., Matteo
Arena & Brandon Julio, The Effects of Securities Class Action Litigation on Corporate Liquidity
and Investment Policy, 50 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 251, 252 (2015) ("Given the
potential size of lawsuit settlements, litigation risk has important implications for expected cash
flows. ... One corporate policy that may be particularly sensitive to litigation risk is the decision
to accumulate cash flow in the form of liquid assets.... Due to the costs associated with raising
external financing and the possibility of future cash-flow shocks, firms have an incentive to save
more cash to avoid raising external capital to finance new investments and other corporate
activities."). However, should litigation result in halting production of a product (by affecting
R&D), a set of future cash flows could be affected. See, e.g., Cohen, Gurun & Kominers, supra
note 90, at 37-38 ("[W]e see that losing to an NPE has a large and negative impact on future
R&D activities .... In all, the evidence in this section strongly supports the idea that NPEs have
a real and negative impact on innovation of United States firms."). The latter alternative would
have the largest impact on the value of the firm. Furthermore, a one-time settlement is a clearly
quantifiable amount, while the alternative scenario would require each investor to estimate the
magnitude of its impact, leading to a higher level of uncertainty about the firm. See, e.g., Martine
Costello, Lawsuits and Your Stock, CNN MONEY (Dec. 3, 1998, 10:08 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/1998/12/03/investing/q-classaction/ [https://perma.cc/48XN-D6SC] ("Philip
Morris investors may have had a coughing fit when Big Tobacco agreed to pay $206 billion to
settle a string of smoking-related lawsuits. But the stock has risen five percent since the Nov. 16
agreement between the major cigarette makers and eight states. So the bad news has actually
paid off. 'The settlement removes uncertainty,' said Bonnie Zoller, a tobacco analyst at Credit
Suisse First Boston."). The firm would be perceived as being more risky, depressing the stock
price even lower. See id.
141. See infra Tables 6A & 6B.
142. See infra Table 6A.
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enactment of the AIA, 49.40 percent of the cases brought were in the
Eastern District of Texas.143 Thus, while there was some decrease in
the number of cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas, it was not
significant in our data set, and it appears that the AIA had very little
impact with respect to forum shopping.144 For the foregoing reasons,
the Authors believe the passage of the AIA is not sufficient to lead to
the different results between this study and the Bessen, Ford, and
Meurer study, but this is an area where additional study on the
impact of the passage of this reform on NPE litigation, and the impact
of choice of venue in general, would be worthwhile.
A final potential explanation is that Bessen, Ford, and Meurer
did not conduct sufficient statistical analysis of their data.145 Their
study provides data for cumulative abnormal returns, but it failed to
provide any advanced statistical analysis regarding how these returns
were distributed.146 A closer look at the nature of the abnormal
returns in this study shows their distribution is negatively skewed on
the day after filing. 147  This indicates their distribution is not
symmetric, and it is influenced by extreme negative values. At the
aggregate level this is quite noticeable since, on all other days around
the filing date, abnormal returns are characterized by positively
skewed distributions. 1 4 8 This suggests investors do react to the filing
but not always with the same "intensity": in a few instances the
reaction might be more extreme than most, leading to abnormal
returns that are not statistically different than zero but that are
negatively skewed.149  The skewness of the returns suggests the
143. See infra Table 6B.
144. The effect of the AIA on forum shopping may increase in the wake of the recent
Supreme Court decision that the reference to patent defendants' state of "residence" in the
patent venue statute means only the state of incorporation for domestic corporations. See TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) ("We therefore hold that
a domestic corporation 'resides' only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue
statute."). This will likely have a strong effect on patent infringement cases going forward, as the
"residence" prong of the venue statute was frequently relied upon by patent litigants to establish
venue in plaintiff-friendly districts like the Eastern District of Texas for corporations not
incorporated in Texas. See Jason M. Wejnert, In TC Heartland Decision, U.S. Supreme Court
Changes the Landscape-and Possibly the Venue-of Patent Litigation, NAT'L L. REV. (June 1,
2017), http://www.natlawreview.comlarticle/tc-heartland-decision-us-supreme-court-changes-
landscape-and-possibly-venue-patent [h tps://perma.cc/43HD-M9XJ].
145. See, e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 646 (noting that some previous
event studies claimed "quite dramatic value effects" but that these results could not be replicated
and could be explained by more advanced statistical tests).
146. See Bessen, Ford, & Meurer, supra note 6, at 29-30; see also McWilliams & Siegel,
supra note 56, at 646.
147. See infra Table 4.
148. See infra Table 4.
149. See infra Table 4.
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abnormal returns could follow a distribution that is not normal, and
thus we conducted additional nonparametric statistical testing.150
The Jarque-Bera test tests the null hypothesis-that the
distribution is normally distributed-by examining both the skewness
and the kurtosis of the data.15 1 Applied to this study's data, in all
cases the Jarque-Bera test rejected the normality of the abnormal
returns.152 This finding questions the appropriateness of the t-tests,
requiring a closer look at the data through nonparametric tests.
Examining the extreme, central, and quartile measures of abnormal
returns suggests the day after filing the abnormal returns experience
the lowest maximum value (0.054) and the largest negative value
(-0.121).153 Examining the percentage of positive and negative
abnormal returns indicates the fifth day after the event has a slightly
higher proportion of positive abnormal returns.154  The Wilcoxon
signed-rank test was used to test significance of the median abnormal
returns.155  The largest statistically significant median (0.00048)
occurs on the fifth day after the filing.156 However, all others are not
statistically significant.15 7  This finding is consistent with the
parametric tests discussed above.
The aggregate results of these statistical tests indicate that in
terms of mean and median abnormal returns there are no significant
reactions on the filing day or its immediate aftermath. However, the
abnormal returns exhibit their extreme negative values the day after
the filing of the lawsuits (-0.12139).158 This suggests that either
different types of filings trigger different market reactions, some being
more extreme, or there are some firms whose investors are more
concerned with patent litigation. In order to answer this question, the
abnormal returns for each firm must be examined. The firm-level
results are reported in Tables 5A, 5B and 5C.159
150. See McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 635 (noting the importance of conducting
nonparametric statistical tests to explain any potential outliers or nonnormal results).
151. See Thorsten Thadewald & Herbert Buning, Jarque-Bera Test and Its Competitors
for Testing Normality-A Power Comparison, 34 J. APPLIED STAT. 87, 88 (2007) (discussing the
Jarque-Bera statistical test and its accepted use in econometrics).
152. See infra Table 4.
153. See infra Table 4.
154. See infra Table 4.
155. See S.M. Taheri & G. Hesamian, A Generalization of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
and Its Applications, 54 STATISTICAL PAPERS 457, 459 (2013) (discussing the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test and its application).
156. See infra Table 4.
157. See Taheri & Hesamian, supra note 155, at 459.
158. See infra Table 4.
159. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
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Tables 5A, 5B and 5C summarize the statistical results for the
firms with the largest number of lawsuits by NPEs.160 The firms are
listed in alphabetical order, and the number of days with at least one
filing is reported next to their names.161 Examining the abnormal
returns shows that on the day of filing only half of the firms (AAPL,
AMZN, and T) exhibit negative mean abnormal returns, and only two
(AAPL and AMZN) exhibit negative median abnormal returns. In all
cases the mean and median are not statistically significant.162 Only
AMZN experiences the lowest percentage of positive abnormal returns
(i.e., the highest percentage of negative abnormal returns) on event
day (t), while four of them-AAPL (38.2% at t-1), AMZN (35.3% at t),
SNE (42.2% at t-2) and T (41.0% at t+2)-experience that effect
within three days of filing day.163 Abnormal returns exhibit negative
skewness the day after filing for five of the six firms (all except VZ),
and in half of the cases (AMZN, MSFT, and T) also on the day of
filing.164
The results at the firm level confirm the presence of
heterogeneity on how different firms react to the filing of the lawsuits.
In all cases, market reactions are relatively weak and affect both the
mean and distribution of the abnormal returns.165 All firms but VZ
exhibit negatively skewed abnormal returns on the day subsequent to
filing.166 This suggests that for the same firm some lawsuits trigger
more extreme reactions than others. Due to this variation of results
for different events, it could be that the large cumulative abnormal
return results reported by Bessen, Ford, and Meurer represent an
accumulation of results from varying events to which investors react
substantially differently, and thus the cumulative results reported do
not paint an accurate picture of the effect of the losses resulting from
all types of NPE litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, the empirical results of this study are in sharp
contrast with the findings of Bessen, Ford, and Meurer. They
examined a large sample of firms across six industries, with firms of a
160. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
161. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
162. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & SC.
163. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & SC.
164. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
165. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
166. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
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wide range of market capitalizations.16 7 Their findings indicate that
for the period spanning 1990-2010, markets reacted negatively to the
filing of lawsuits by NPEs.168 Bessen, Ford, and Meurer suggest
technology and software are more likely targets because patents in
that sector tend to be more vulnerable to inadvertent breaches.169
This study, by contrast, selects firms among the most targeted in
those sectors and spans more recent times. Consistent with Bessen,
Ford, and Meurer, this study finds the number of filings has increased
over time; however, we find that equity investors do not react as
sharply as they suggest. The negative skewness of aggregate
abnormal returns the day after the filing indicates that in some
instances investors' reactions are quite strong;170 however, this also
indicates parametric statistical tests could be inappropriate.171 The
nonparametric tests conducted in this study confirm the weak
reactions of investors.
A number of hypotheses could be consistent with these findings
of weak abnormal returns and negative skewness. Suppose with the
passage of time, investors now realize that the lawsuits will be quickly
settled and the NPEs do not have a real intention to halt the
production of a particular product of the target firm; then, filing would
produce no abnormal returns and no visible change in the skewness,
as a technology-based firm's stock price may already reflect its
investors' expectation that it will have to settle some patent lawsuits.
This would ameliorate the impact of any information that another
NPE patent lawsuit has been filed, as long as that lawsuit is of the
type to which investors have become accustomed.
167. See Bessen, Ford, & Meurer, supra note 6, at 29.
168. See id. at 26.
169. See id. at 28 (discussing how software and related technology patents often have
"fuzzy boundaries" and can therefore be litigated more frequently due to unintentional breaches).
170. In this context, skewness indicates the asymmetry of the distribution of abnormal
returns. The presence of negative skewness, together with the finding of the largest negative
abnormal return the day after filing (see Table 4), suggests that around filing dates there are
extreme negative abnormal returns. The distribution of abnormal returns outside of the filing
dates does not exhibit this behavior. The Authors attribute the change in distribution to the
filing event.
171. Parametric statistical tests are valid only if the distribution of the data follows a
known distribution (e.g., normal, Student's t, etc.). Parametric testing is still valid if the data
deviates marginally from the underlying distributions; however, if the data deviates too much
from the underlying distributions, parametric testing will no longer be valid. See, e.g., TANYA
HOSKIN, MAYO CLINIC DEP'T OF HEALTH Scis. RESEARCH, PARAMETRIC AND NONPARAMETRIC:
DEMYSTIFYING THE TERMS 2, https://www.mayo.edulmayo-edu-docs/center-for-translational-
science-activities-documents/berd-5-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC6Z- 5EQL] ("Parametric statistical
procedures rely on assumptions about the shape of the distribution (i.e., assume a normal
distribution) in the underlying population and about the form or parameters (i.e., means and
standard deviations) of the assumed distribution.").
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The negative skew at the aggregate level, however, suggests
two alternative hypotheses: either some lawsuits are associated with
significant sell-off or investors in some firms perceive the lawsuits as
being detrimental in the long run. The tests at the firm level
demonstrate that, using parametric and nonparametric tests, the
majority of the firms do not experience significant negative returns on
the day of filing. 172 All except one of the firms (VZ) experience
negative skew the day after the filing. 173 These two findings support
the second of the previous hypotheses: investors perceive some filings
as being a threat to the target's future profitability and others as
nonthreats. These findings suggest further event studies may need to
focus on the types of patent filings that are most likely to be used
opportunistically by NPEs and could potentially cause unnecessary
economic harm.
These findings do not completely contradict those of Bessen,
Ford, and Meurer, but shed a different light. Perhaps the increased
media coverage on NPEs' activity has educated investors, who realize
the true intent of these organizations is to collect monetary
compensation rather than prevent the development of a product in its
entirety. Investors would perceive this as a one-time expense rather
than a permanent hurdle to the firm's ability to innovate and benefit
from R&D. The skewness of the results suggests that perhaps
investors have become more sophisticated over the years, and instead
of initiating selloffs large enough to depress the price of the target's
common stock, they evaluate each case and react more conservatively.
Overall, the results indicate the need for further research in
this area and highlight the danger of deriving strong inferences of
economic losses from event studies without robust statistical
testing.174 While event studies can be useful in public policy research,
sweeping conclusions, such as broad statements of the economic loss
attributable to NPE litigation made by Bessen, Ford, and Meurer,175
can be problematic without additional statistical scrutiny.
Policymakers tend to seize on large, cumulative numbers, but nuances
in the data can be lost when such broad results are reported.176 This
study was not able to confirm the abnormal negative returns from the
172. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
173. See infra Tables 5A, 5B & 5C.
174. See, e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 646 (noting that some previous
event studies claimed "quite dramatic value effects" but that these results could not be replicated
and could be explained by more advanced statistical tests).
175. See Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 6, at 26 ("We find that NPE lawsuits are
associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010.
During the last four years, the lost wealth has averaged over $80 billion per year.").
176. See, e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, supra note 56, at 650.
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Bessen, Ford, and Meurer study even when applied to only large
NPEs, and any initially perceived abnormal negative returns were
slight, or not present, upon further statistical analysis. This study
casts at least some doubt on whether mass aggregator NPE entities as
a whole-at least in the minds of large public company
stockholders-create the economic harm that many allege. Further
research is necessary into whether especially problematic types of
NPE litigation exist.
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